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Articles I1 and I11 of The Uniform Probate Code
As Enacted in Utah
Comment
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is the result of 7 years'
work' by some of the most experienced probate attorneys in the
~ o u n t r yIn
. ~ 1969, the UPC was approved by both the American
Bar Association and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, who had jointly directed the creation of
the UPC.3In using the UPC, state legislatures are now able to
make large-scale improvements in their probate law that would
be extremely difficult to make if undertaken piecemeal. By
adopting the UPC in 1975,' Utah joined the small number of
states5 that have availed themselves of the advantages of the
UPC. Although the Utah version of the UPC, the Utah Uniform
Probate Code (UUPC),"greatly improves and modernizes Utah's
probate law, it embodies many departures from the UPC.
The objectives of the UPC are to simplify and clarify inheritance laws and related matters, to give effect to the intent of the
decedent, and to provide versatility and efficiency in distributing
the decedent's estate.' Simplicity and clarity in the law are promoted both by modifying traditional common law approaches
and by making uniform the laws of the various jurisdictions. Uniformity, then, is an important policy of the UPC. It appears,
1. The Uniform Probate Code was begun in 1962 and finally approved in 1969. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN.L. REV.453
(1970).
2. 8 UNIFORM
LAWSANN.282-85 (1972).
3. Id. a t 281 (historical note).
4. The Utah Uniform Probate Code was passed by the Utah legislature on March 13,
1975, to become effective July 1, 1977. Utah Uniform Probate Code ch. 150, 8 75. [I9751
Utah Laws 714.
5. The states that have adopted the UPC in some form are, with their effective dates:
Alaska (January 1, 1973); Arizona (January 1, 1974); Colorado (July 1, 1974); Florida
(July 1, 1975); Idaho (July 1,1972); Minnesota (August 1, 1975); Montana (July 1, 1975);
Nebraska (July 1, 1977); New Mexico (July 1, 1976); North Dakota (July 1, 1975); and
South Dakota (July 1, 1975). 8 UNIFORM
LAWSANN.54 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT.ANN.8
32A-1-101, note (Supp. 1975).
6. Utah Uniform Probate Code ch. 150, 8 75, [I9751 Utah Laws 579-715 (effective
July 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as UUPC].
7. UNIFORM
PROBATE
CODE § 1-102(b) [hereinafter cited as UPC]. See Rollison,
427, 428 (1968); Curry,
Commentary On The Uniform Probate Code, 29 ALA. LAWYER
Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article 11of the Uniform
Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 OHIOS.L.J. 114 (1973).
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however, that the aim of the UPC to achieve national uniformity
of probate law8 will not be completely achieved. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, which was drafted to make the law conform to existing business practices and custom^,^ the UPC attempts to simplify many aspects of probate law by changing traditional practices. As a result, the UPC has met resistance; the
states that have considered it have either adopted it with many
changes or have refused to adopt it a t all.1°
The draftsmen recognized that on some issues deviation from
the UPC format might be justified by the particular needs of a
jurisdiction." Two studies, one by the Utah State Bar Association
and the other by the Utah legislature, were conducted to determine if the UPC would meet the needs of Utah residents and to
formulate any necessary modifications. Working from both studies and with the aid of independent counsel, the Government
Operations Committee of the Legislative Council drafted the
UUPC. The original UUPC draft modified 90 of the 310 UPC
sections, eliminated 6, and added 12 new sections.12The UUPC
was further amended while before the Utah legislature. Despite
these changes, the UUPC, although not perfectly uniform with
the UPC, retains much of the versatility and simplicity of the
UPC policies and format.
This comment will compare the material differences between
articles I1 and I11 of the UUPC and the corresponding sections of
the UPC. The comparison will follow the organization of the UPC
so that the reader can more easily locate material in which he
may have a particular interest.13
8. UPC 91-102(5); UUPC § 75-1-102(5).
9. Gilmore, Article 9: What I t Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV.285, 294 (1966).
10. California rejected the UPC as not constituting an improvement over existing
law. THESTATEBAROF CALIFORNIA,
THEUNIFORM
PROBATE
CODE:ANALYSIS
AND CRITIQUE
23 (March 1973). For a comparison of the alterations made by the various states that have
enacted UPC art. I1 see Wellman, Uniformity In State Inheritance Laws: How UPC
Article II Has Fared In Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.357. Alaska and North
Dakota passed the UPC substantially intact. ALASKA
STAT.5 13 (1972); N.D. CENT.CODE
5 30.1 (Spec. Uniform Probate Code Supp. 1975). New Jersey has substantially adopted
UPC $5 2-110, 5-501, -502. 8 UNIFORM
LAWSANN.54 (Supp. 1975).
11. All bracketed language of the UPC was intended to be only suggestive, optional,
or easily omitted. UPC 9 2-803, Comment; see, e.g., UPC § 2-102, -102A, -401A, -803.
12. Giles & Miller, A Synopsis of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (Dec. 1974) (unpublished report on file a t the office of the Utah State Bar).
13. UPC art. 11, pt. 7, dealing with contractual arrangements relating to death, and
pt. 9, pertaining to the custody or deposit of wills, have been enacted in Utah without
substantial change. Therefore, they are not treated by this comment. The same is true of
art. 111, pts. 2, 4, 5, 11.
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Article 11, dealing with intestate succession and wills, and
article III, dealing with probate of wills and administration, contain the heart of the UPC. Ideally, alterations embodied in the
UUPC should not frustrate the policies of the UPC; rather, they
should promote the UPC policies of simplifying and clarifying
probate law, giving effect to the intent of a decedent, and promoting speed and efficiency in distributing the estate of a decedent.
Of course, changes suited to the particular needs of Utah residents are encouraged; alterations that unjustifiably perpetuate
traditional approaches taken by previous law, however, are disapproved.

In several significant areas of article 11, the UUPC has followed prior Utah law rather than adopting the approach of the
UPC. The motive for adhering to prior Utah law, however, generally seems to be that of maintaining the status quo rather than a
legitimate desire to improve the UPC or adapt it to meet the
needs of Utah residents.

A. Part 1 -Intestate Succession
Part 1 contains the rules that govern succession to the estate
of a decedent who has not executed a will or whose will has been
held invalid. This part, more than any other, adheres to prior
Utah law.
Section 2-103(1) of the UPC allocates the portion of the intestate estate not taken by a spouse
to the issue of the decedent; if they are all of the same degree of
kinship to the decedent they take equally, but if of unequal
degree, then those of more remote degree take by representation . . . .14

Under this section the children of the decedent take equally; any
deceased child's issue take his share by representation. Representation is defined by section 2-106:
If representation is called for by this Code, the estate is
divided into as many shares as there are surviving heirs in the
nearest degree of kinship and deceased persons in the same
degree who left issue who survive the decedent, each surviving
heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and the share of
14. UPC $ 2-103(1).
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each deceased person in the same degree being divided among
his issue in the same manner.15

Thus, the approach of the UPC is to make the initial division of
an estate in the decedent's first descending generation containing
a living heir. For example, if all children of an intestate predecease him, his grandchildren take his estate in equal shares rather
than dividing the estate a t the level of the deceased children and
giving each grandchild his share of the deceased child's share.
Then, at the level of initial distribution, any deceased heir's share
will be apportioned among his issue by representation. The UPC
approach gives the issue in the first generation with a survivor
equal shares, rejecting the position that the principal division of
an estate should be in the first generation regardless of whether
it contains a living member.
The UUPC, rather than accepting the UPC approach, has
adopted the prior Utah descent provisions.16 Section 2-103(a) of
the UUPC distributes the estate not taken by a spouse "to the
issue of the decedent by representation." UUPC section 2-106
then defines representation:
If representation is called for by this code, the descendant
or descendants of any deceased heir take the same share or right
in the estate of another person that his parent would have taken
if living."

The result is that the UUPC first divides the estate into a s many
shares as there are living children of the intestate and deceased
children of the intestate with living issue. This division is made
even if all the intestate's children have predeceased him, giving
individual grandchildren unequal shares when the deceased children's families vary in size.
There is no clear reason to reject the UPC approach in favor
of one that discriminates between members of the same generation. Any desire a decedent may have had to give equally to the
ancestors of the first living generation is most likely gone when
those ancestors are deceased. Moreover, awarding unequal shares
to members of the first surviving generation could promote disharmony among family members.
A further deficiency in the operation of UUPC section 2103(a) arises since that section does not expressly provide for
-

15. UPC $ 2-106.
16. UTAHCODEANN. $ 74-4-23 (1953).
17. UUPC $ 75-2-106.
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equal division of the estate to the issue or the representatives of
deceased issue of the same degree of relation to the intestate, as
do both the UPCIRand prior Utah law.19 Rather, UUPC section
2-103(a) directs only that the issue take by representation. This
statutory deficiency creates a problem in light of Utah case law
that holds succession to be "purely a matter of statutory regulat i ~ n . "The
~ ~ case law does not provide that persons who take by
representation must take equally. Thus, it is not clear that the
intestate's estate is to be divided equally either among the issue
and representatives of deceased issue a t the first generation of
distribution or among those taking any deceased issue's share by
representation. This departure from the UPC, also a departure
from Utah's prior position, is unjustified because it leaves the law
ambiguous.
Taken together, Utah's deviations from the UPC in sections
2-103(a) and 2-106 introduce another ambiguity. UUPC section
2-103(a) gives the part of the estate not passing to the spouse
"[tlo the issue of the decedent by r e p r e ~ e n t a t i o n . " Under
~~
UUPC section 2-106, representation gives "the descendant or descendants of any deceased heir . . . the same share or right in the
estate of another person that his parent would have taken if living."22By the literal terms of these statutes, then, a child of the
intestate would not be able to take a share of the estate since the
intestate is not an heir of his own estate. Such a result, certainly
not intended by the Utah legislature, would probably be avoided
by the courts through the application of common law principles."
It is unfortunate, however, that in such a common situation as
distribution of an intestate estate to children of the decedent, the
courts of Utah will have to look outside the code for the control18. UPC § 2-103(a).
19. UTAHCODEANN.4 74-4-5(2) (Supp. 1975) states, in pertinent part:
If the decedent leaves no surviving husband or wife, but leaves issue, the
whole estate goes to such issue, and if such issue consists of more than one child
living, or one child living and the issue of one or more deceased children, then
the estate goes in equal shares to the children living, or to the child living and
the issue of the deceased child or children by right of representation. For purposes of this subsection, issue shall include adopted children.
(emphasis added).
20. In re Yonk's Estate, 115 Utah 292, 295, 204 P.2d 452, 454 (1949).
21. UUPC 5 75-2-103(a).
22. UUPC § 75-2-106 (emphasis added).
23. By using the term "representation" to describe the distribution system by which
the children of an intestate receive their intestate share, however, Utah courts must ignore
the traditional view that the term connotes taking the share of an immediate ancestor who
LAWDICTIONARY
1465 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
would have inherited if he had lived. See BLACK'S
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ling principle, especially since the code was intended to be a
comprehensive treatment of probate problems.
Section 2-103 of the UPC limits intestate succession to the
decedent's grandparents and their descendants, eliminating more
remote relatives.24Section 2-105 causes the estate to escheat if no
grandparents or lineal descendants of grandparents are alive to
take by intestacy. The UUPC, adhering to former Utah law,25
rejects the UPC approach by allowing any kin, however remote,
to take by i n t e ~ t a c yThe
. ~ ~UPC system reflects the modern thinking that if the intestate had disposed of his property by will, he
probably would not have included among his devisees the more
remote relatives who take by intestate succession under many
statutes now in e~istence.~'
In addition, the UPC approach of
limiting the relatives who may take a share of the estate is based
on its policy to streamline and simplify probate.28The increased
costs of litigation and the delays caused by seeking out remote
heirs or examining spurious claims29inherent in the Utah system
are avoided by the UPC approach. Furthermore, it is doubtful
whether the Utah alteration better effectuates the decedent's intent than does the UPC. Especially in light of the added burden
on administration caused by the UUPC approach, decedents
likely would prefer escheat for the benefit of the public or, under
the UUPC, for the state school system30over intestate succession
to remote relatives.
Section 2-110 of the UPC, governing advancements, requires
a contemporaneous writing by the intestate or a written acknowledgment by the heir if an inter vivos gift to the heir is to be
considered part of the heir's share of the estate. In contrast, the
UUPC does not require that the decedent's writing be contemporaneous with the gift. The recipient of such a gift, therefore, cannot be certain if it constitutes an advancement until the death of
the donor. Further, since the donor may change the character of
the gift until death, claims of undue influence may be more frequent. The simplicity and certainty of requiring the writing to be
contemporaneous with the gift seem preferable, especially since
24. UPC $ 2-103, Comment.
25. UTAHCODEANN. § 74-4-5(6) (1953).
26. UUPC $ 75-2-103(e).
27. UPC $ 2-103, Comment; Rollison, supra note 7, at 428-29.
28. See note 7 and accompanying test supra.
29. See Rollison, supra note 7, at 429.
30. UUPC § 75-2-105 earmarks escheated intestate estates for the benefit of the state
school fund.
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the donor can still change the effect of the writing by executing a
subsequent will.
The UPC also provides that the advancement does not reduce the shares of the recipient's issue, should the recipient predecease the intestate, unless the writing states otherwi~e.~'
The
UUPC takes the opposite approach, presuming that the advancement reduces the share to be distributed to the recipient's issue
unless the writing provides otherwise.32The succeeding language
of the UUPC33makes it clear that the Utah change was intentional. It does not, however, explain the contradictory positions
taken with respect to the heir and his issue. Under the Utah
approach, if the heir survives the intestate, the heir's issue stand
to eventually receive both the value of the gift to the heir and the
full intestate share received by the heir. If the heir predeceases
the intestate, however, the heir's issue will receive only the intestate share of the heir reduced by the value of the gift. Why the
UUPC takes the position that a lifetime gift to an heir is presumed not to be an advancement, but such a gift is treated as if
it were an advancement to the issue of the heir if the heir predeceases the intestate, is not clear.

B. Part 2-Elective Share of Surviving Spouse
Both codes provide that the elective share of the surviving
spouse shall be one-third of the augmented estate as defined in
section 2-202. The augmented estate concept is designed to protect both the estate and the surviving spouse by ensuring the
surviving spouse a fair share, but only a fair share, of the decedent's property. This is accomplished by adding to the probate
estate of the decedent: (1) certain property that he has transferred to persons other than the surviving spouse during the marriage, to the extent that he received less than full c ~ n s i d e r a t i o n ; ~ ~
(2) the value of the surviving spouse's property derived from the
intestate for less than full consideration; and (3) any transfers of
such property made by the spouse during the marriage for less
than full ons side ration.^^
-

-

31. UPC $ 2-110.
32. UUPC § 75-2-110.
33. The last sentence of UUPC 6 75-2-110 states:
"If the amount of the advancement exceeds the share of the heir receiving the same,
he is not required, however, to refund any part of the advancement."
34. UPC g 2-202(1).
35. UPC g 2-202(2).
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The UUPC, however, adds a new subsection to the definition
of the augmented estate that substantially restricts the category
of property includable in the augmented estate:
The augmented estate includes only property and transfers
thereof acquired by the deceased spouse during marriage to the
surviving spouse other than by gift, devise or descent or the
increase, rents, issues and profits from this property and on
property owned prior to marriage.36

There might be some justification for this alteration. Since the
UPC exempts from the augmented estate property acquired before marriage by the surviving spouse, it does not seem inconsistent to exempt all property that comes as a windfall to the marriage. On the other hand, by exempting the rents and profits
derived from pre-marriage property from the augmented estate,
the UUPC may substantially reduce the amount available to a
surviving spouse taking the elective share. Since the rents and
profits on such property were earned during the marriage, it is
reasonable to include them in the augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective share. Although the impact of this
section will not affect all estates equally, it is clear that in many
situations it will reduce the advantages of the elective share remedy.
Section 2-205 of the UUPC allows the surviving spouse a
longer period to petition for the elective share than is allowed by
the corresponding section of the UPC. The UPC allows the surviving spouse 6 months following the publication of notice to creditors to take the elective share. In most cases, this confines the
election to the period preceding the final probate of the will. In
contrast, the UUPC allows the election to be made within 1year
after the date of death or within 6 months following the probate
of the decedent's will, whichever expires last.37The longer time
period is unnecessary. A surviving spouse has sufficient time
under the limit established by the UPC to determine the advantage of taking under the will as opposed to electing one-third of
the augmented estate. Although the UUPC extension allows the
spouse to "wait and see" how the economy affects the various
assets of the estate, an election after final probate could generate
considerable expense, thereby reducing the estate further. The
objective of the UPC to minimize legal costs and streamline pro36. UUPC § 75-2-202(2).
37. UUPC 9 75-2-205(1).
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bate is hindered by extending the time available for election.
Section 2-206(b) of the UPC requires that if the will has
clearly provided gifts in lieu of the spouse's homestead allowance,
exempt property allowance, or family allowance, the spouse is not
entitled to these allowances unless the related gifts under the will
are renounced. The UUPC eliminates this restriction, allowing
the spouse these statutory benefits regardless of whether or not
the spouse renounces any gifts in the
The elective share, the
homestead allowance, and other statutory benefits are limits on
a testator's power to disinherit his spouse and children, and on
creditors' power to reach the estate in satisfaction of their claims.
When the testator wishes to disinherit the spouse, UPC section
2-206(b) gives as much effect to the testor's intent to disinherit
as public policy allows. The statutory limitations, however, are
unnecessary to the extent that the spouse and children have been
provided for in the will. Although a spouse can always frustrate
the decedent's intent by taking an elective share, there appears
to be no sound reason to permit the spouse to take property that
exceeds both the testator's intent and the statutory protections.
Such is the effect of the UUPC modification.

C. Part 3-Spouse and Children Unprovided for i n Wills
Part 3 gives the spouse and children omitted from the will
the same share they would have received had the decedent died
intestate unless either the will indicates that the omission was
intentional or other requirements are met. These other requirements are the same for the omitted spouse in both codes,39but
are different for the omitted children.40Section 2-303(2) of the
UUPC, in conformity with the UPC, requires that to disinherit
any child, it is necessary (1) that it appear from the will that the
omission was intentional; (2) that the bulk of the estate be given
to the surviving parent of the omitted child; or (3) that inter
vivos gifts have been given in lieu of a testamentary p r o ~ i s i o n . ~ ~
The UPC provides that the section applies only to children born
or adopted after the execution of the will; the UUPC, however,
contains no such restriction. The UUPC, then, requires the testator to satisfy one of the above requirements in order to disinherit
even children born or adopted before the execution of the will.
38.
39.
40.
41.

UUPC § 75-2-206.
UPC 2-301; UUPC § 75-2-301.
UPC § 2-302(a); UUPC 9 75-2-302(1).
UUPC $9 75-2-302(1)(a) to ( c ) .
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The UPC provision is based on the presumption that if the testator failed to mention a child born or adopted prior to the execution of the will, he intended to disinherit him. This presumption
seems consonant with the intent of the testator. If the testator
failed to mention a living child in his will, it is likely that he
intended to disinherit him. The UUPC approach, however, may
be justifiable as insurance against an unintentional omission by
the testator.
Compounding the problems of section 2-302, the UUPC adds
that if the issue of a deceased child of the testator are not provided for in the will and the omission does not fit within the
exceptions of section 2-302, such issue of the deceased child take
the intestate share of the deceased child despite their omission
from the will. This addition requires the testator to anticipate in
his estate plan the death of each child if he intends to disinherit
the child's issue. It also creates an ambiguity. A literal interpretation of language of UUPC section 2-302 would allow the issue of
a deceased child not only an intestate share of the estate if they
were pretermitted from the will, but also their shares of the deceased child's testamentary gifts if he were not ~retermitted.'~
In
all probability the drafters of the UUPC did not intend this result. Consequently, an amendment is necessary to make the right
of a deceased child's issue to take an intestate share under this
section dependent upon the pretermission of the deceased child.

D. Part 4-Exempt Property and Allowances
Part 4 of the UPC describes certain rights to which a surviving spouse and children of a decedent are entitled that are superior to claims against the estate. I t provides that the homestead
all~wance,'~
exempt property allowance,44and family allowance45
have priority over all other claims against the estate. If the estate
42. This result is specifically allowed by the antilapse provisions of the UUPC:
If a devisee who is an heir of the testator is dead a t the time of execution of
the will, fails to survive the testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the
testator, the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator by 120 hours
take in place of the deceased devisee by representation. One who would have
been a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the testator is treated as a
devisee for purposes of this section whether his death occurred before or after
the execution of the will.
UUPC 5 75-2-605.
43. UPC § 2-401.
44. UPC 5 2-402.
45. UPC § 2-403.
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is insufficient to satisfy all three allowances, it is applied first to
the homestead allowance, then to the family allowance, and finally to the exempt property a l l o w a n ~ e . ~ ~
The UUPC makes two significant changes in this part by
incorporating the homestead allowance as defined by prior Utah
law," and by providing that reasonable funeral expenses take
priority over all claims except the homestead a l l o ~ a n c eThe
.~~
Utah homestead provisions require that the decedent have a real
property interest from which the allowance can be satisfied. If he
has no real property, the surviving spouse may claim no homestead allowance.49In contrast, the UPC recognizes that since ownership of land is not as universal as it once was, it is necessary to
allow a cash equivalent of the homestead allowance in order to
adequately protect some surviving spouses. Thus, Utah's adherence to the traditional approach fails to protect the survivors of
Utah residents who have no interest in real property. Giving
priority to funeral bills over claims of other creditors and the
rights of the surviving spouse and children is inconsistent with
the UPC approach that treats creditors equally and guarantees
a t least part of the estate to the widow and children.

E. Part 5- Wills
The UPC policy of providing flexibility and simplicity is evidenced in part 5, which governs the rules for the execution and
construction of wills. By adhering to prior law, however, Utah has
retained much of the rigidity the UPC attempts to avoid. For
example, section 2-502 of both codes requires the witnesses to a
will to: (1) observe the signing of the will by the testator; (2) re46. UPC § § 2-402, -403.
47. UTAHCODEANN. 5 28-1-1 (Supp. 1975) provides the homestead allowance in
Utah:
A homestead consisting of lands, appurtenances and improvements, which
lands may be in one or more localities, not exceeding in value with the appurtenances and improvements thereon the sum of $4,000 for the head of the family,
and the further sum of $1,500 for the spouse, and $600 for each other members
of the family, shall be exempt from judgment lien and from execution or forced
sale, except upon the following obligations: (1) taxes accruing and levied
thereon; (2) judgments obtained on debts secured by lawful mortgage on the
premises and on debts created for the purchase price thereof; and (3) judgments
obtained by an appropriate party on debts created by failure to provide support
or maintenance for dependent children.
48. See UUPC § § 75-2-401 to -403.
49. See, e.g., Rich Coop. Ass'n v. Dustin, 14 Utah 2d 408, 385 P.2d 155 (1963);
Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 206, 69 P.2d 614, 619 (1937).
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ceive acknowledgment by the testator that the signature on the
will is his; or (3) receive an acknowledgment by the testator that
UUPC further requires that "[tlhe signing
the will is hi~.~Vl?he
by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence and in the
presence of each other."51 This is the traditional rule in Utah.52
Unfortunately, its reenactment frustrates the UPC attempt to
simplify the process of execution by allowing each signature to a
will to be an isolated event.
The UPC approach is superior. Where the witnesses know
that the will is the testator's, as they must under the requirements of section 2-502, the fact that they do not sign the will in
the presence of the testator or in the presence of each other should
not invalidate the will. Situations such as the illness of the testator may well indicate that the prudent course of action would be
to allow mere formalities to be completed in a method more suitable to the circumstance-that is, out of his presence. The little
additional protection from fraud that these formalities provide
fails to justify the frustration of the testator's wishes when the
will is held invalid because of a mere defective formality in execution. It is even questionable whether this formality will prevent
fraud since those who perpetrate fraud would be careful to comply with the technical formalities of will execution.53
Section 2-505 of the UUPC is more restrictive than its UPC
counterpart as to who may qualify as a witness to a will. The UPC
states that "[alny person generally competent to be a witness
may act as a witness to a will."54It expressly rejects any penalties
for the use of an interested witness.55The UUPC, on the other
hand, requires that a witness be 18 years of age or olderS6and
provides that a witness who is a beneficiary of the will is limited
in the amount he may take under the will to the equivalent of his
intestate share.57The UPC approach is more consistent with the
policies of promoting simplicity and giving effect to the testator's
intent. Although it would be rare that an attorney would use a
person under the age of 18 or an interested party as a witness,
such practices occasionally occur either out of necessity or igno50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

UPC 5 2-502; UUPC § 75-2-502.
UUPC 5 75-2-502.
UTAHCODEANN. $ 74:l-5 (1953).
UPC 5 2-505, Comment.
UPC 5 2-505.
UPC 5 2-505(b).
UUPC $ 75-2-505(1).
UUPC 75-2-505(2).
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rance. These UUPC restrictions on the competency of witnesses
fail to materially reduce the possibility of fraud58and may unnecessarily invalidate wills.
Another important difference between the UUPC and the
UPC is the approach taken toward holographic wills. UUPC section 2-503, again incorporating prior Utah law," states that "[a]
will . . . is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed,
if the signature and the provisions are in the handwriting of the
testator."" The UPC, however, requires only that the "material"
provisions be in the handwriting of the testator. Under the UPC's
requirement that only the material provisions and the signature
be in the testator's handwriting, a judge can ignore nondispositive
printed, stamped, or typed language in the document, and permit
the use of some will forms." The UUPC again adopts an inflexible
approach that burdens both testator and judiciary. Invalidating
a holographic will for such a minor detail as having the date or
introductory language printed, stamped, or typed is unnecessarily harsh.
As a precautionary feature, UUPC section 2-503 adds that if
several holographic wills with "conflicting provisions" exist, a
proferred will, to be valid, "must be dated or circumstances exist
~ ~ addition apthat establish which will was last e x e c ~ t e d . "This
pears to add little to the UPC since any time more than one will
is offered as controlling the disposition of a testator's property,
evidence must be adduced as to which is valid. This feature of
UUPC section 2-503 should not be read to preclude courts from
giving effect to all offered wills to the extent that their provisions
are not inconsistent when no will can be proven to have been the
last executed.63
UUPC section 2-508, in addition to making divorce effective
as a revocation of the disposition in a prior will to the divorced
spouse (as does the UPC), also makes the divorce effective as a
revocation of dispositions to the issue of the divorced spouse who
are not also issue of the testator. This addition appears consistent
with the policy of the UPC to give effect to the intent of the
decedent and thus represents an improvement on the UPC.
58. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
59. UTAHCODEANN.§ 74-1-6 (1953).
60. UUPC 75-2-503.
61. UPC § 2-503, Comment.
62. UUPC § 75-2-503.
63. See In re Howard's Estate, 3 Utah 2d 76, 81, 278 P.2d 622, 625-26 (1955); UTAH
CODEANN.$ 5 74-1-22, 74-2-4 (1953); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 652, 663-64 (1927).
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UUPC section 2-508 also defines divorce to include an interlocutory decree entered by a court.64Possible ambiguities are thus
avoided, and the intent of the testator is more probably fulfilled.
Consequently, Utah's alterations of section 2-508 are more compatible with the policies of the UPC than is the UPC itself.
UPC section 2-513 allows a will to refer to a separate writing
listing dispositions of tangible personal property not disposed of
in the will. Since the list may be altered by the testator without
the formalities of will execution, expense and other problems associated with the amendment of a will can be avoided. The UUPC
adopts this provision, but modifies it slightly by requiring that if
several such lists containing conflicting provisions exist, "the
writing to be given effect must be dated or circumstances exist
that establish which writing is the most recent."65 As discussed
previously, since the court must determine this issue using the
same type of evidence under the UPC,66Utah's change adds little.

F. Part 6-Rules of Construction
Both the UPC and the UUPC provide that, absent a contrary
express provision in the will, if a devisee fails to survive the testator by 120 hours, he is deemed to have predeceased the testatorae7
The effect of this provision is to avoid double taxation of the
estate and to ensure that the testator's property descends through
the testator rather than through the devisee. The UUPC adds a
presumption that a devisee failed to survive the testator if it
cannot be proven that he survived by 120 hours.6RThis is merely
an incorporation of the concept of the Simultaneous Death
which presumes survival where the time of death is uncertain.
The UUPC concept dovetails nicely with the 120-hour approach
of the UPC, and is compatible with UPC policies.
UPC section 2-602 allows the testator to choose the law
applicable to any provision of the will unless the effect would be
contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction deciding the issue.
The UUPC, by requiring further that the designated law not conflict with the provisions of the spouse's elective share or the statu64. The section provides, in pertinent part: "For purposes of this section, divorce or
annulment has reference to the interlocutory decree entered by the court . . . ." UUPC
8 75-2-508.
65. UUPC $ 75-2-513.
66. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
67. UPC 2-601; UUPC 8 75-2-601.
68. UUPC 8 75-2-601(2).
LAWSANN.605 (1972). See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
69. 8 UNIFORM
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tory benefits of part 4,70only makes express what could have been
accomplished under the original UPC section. If Utah public policy with respect to the treatment of the surviving spouse is reflected by the rules governing the elective share and other benefits, then foreign law chosen by the testator could not preempt the
statutory provisions even in the absence of Utah's express modification to the UPC.
Section 2-611 of the UUPC omits the following italicized language from the UPC:
Halfbloods, adopted persons, and persons born out of wedlock
are included in class gift terminology and terms of relationship
in accordance with rules for determining relationship for purposes of intestate succession, but a person born out of wedlock
is not treated as the child of .the father unless the person is
openly and notoriously so treated by the father.71

Omission of this language permits an illegitimate child to claim
a share of the estate even though the child was never recognized
or supported by the decedent. As a result, Utah's version may
encourage litigation. The lighter burden of proof required by Utah
may encourage bona fide illegitimate children, usually prone to
challenge distributions that ignore them,72to claim against the
will, and may even encourage imposters to make such claims. The
danger of increased litigation, however, is arguably outweighed
by the sound policy of placing illegitimate children on equal footing with legitimate children for the purposes of class gifts, as has
been done by the UPC in intestacy question^.'^
UPC section 2-612 provides that gifts transferred to a devisee
during the lifetime of the testator are applied toward satisfaction
of his devise (ademption) only if the will so states in a contemporaneous writing or the devisee acknowledges the same in writing.
The UUPC, however, does not require that a writing by the testator be contemporaneous with the gift. In Utah, a testator may
make an inter vivos gift and then, at any time before his death,
decide that it is in satisfaction of the devise. While certainly a
more flexible approach, this modification has undesirable effects.
Transfers originally made as gifts, later to be transformed into
UUPC 4 75-2-602.
UPC § 2-611.
See, e.g., In re Newell's Estate, 78 U t a h 463, 5 P.2d 230 (1931).
UPC § 2-109(2). See generally Note, Uniform Probate Code-IllegitimacyInheritance and the Illegitimate: A Mode for Probate Reform, 69 MICH.L. REV.112
L. REV.45 (1959).
(1970); Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN
70.
71.
72.
73.
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satisfaction of a devise, could be a source of dissatisfaction leading to litigation among the beneficiaries. The same result may be
obtained under the UPC, however, if the testator complies with
the formalities necessary to change his will. It is thought that the
added required formalities are necessary to prevent changes motivated by a mere whim of the testator or by undue influence.

G. Part 8-General

Provisions

Part 8 governs, among other things, the renunciation of a
testamentary gift .74 The UUPC renumbers the sections that follow the renunciation rules and adds a new section.75The purpose
of Utah's added section (UUPC section 2-802) is to allow persons
to disclaim transfers of a nontestamentary nature,?' thus expanding the group of interests that may be renounced. The section provides added flexibility in tax and estate planning by allowing a donee to renounce nontestamentary gifts that might
have adverse tax effects on him or that might run counter to the
decedent's wishes for some reason.'? Gifts made within 9 months
of the decedent's death may figure significantly in the recipient's
estate plan or the decedent's estate plan even though nontestamentary in nature. Nevertheless, the inclusion of renunciation
provisions for nontestamentary transfers in the probate code
seems out of place.
The UUPC requires that such renunciations of nontestamentary gifts be filed within 9 months after the transfer is made or 9
months after a person first learns of his interest in the gift or
right.7RThe renunciation rule for testamentary gifts, UUPC section 2-801, increases the period for renouncing a testamentary gift
from 6 months, as provided by the UPC, to 9 months following
the death of the testator or the ascertainment by the beneficiary.
The reasons for allowing this extended time period are not clear.
Since Utah's extension further delays the probate process, however, the approach of the UPC seems preferable.
74. UPC Q 2-801; UUPC Q 75-2-801.
75. The UUPC added 5 75-2-802 (nontestamentary transfers), placing it after the
renunciation rules in UPC Q 2-801 and before the rules governing the effect of divorce in
Q 2-802 (UUPC 8 75-2-803).
76. This section is substantially the same as the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers
LAWSANN.23 (Supp. 1975).
Under Nontestamentary Instruments Act. 8 UNIFORM
77. See generally Howe, Renunciation by the Heir, Devisee, or Legatee, 42 K Y . L.J.
605 (1954).
78. UUPC § 75-2-802(2)(a).
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H. Part 10-Simultaneous Death Provisions
All of UUPC part 10 is an addition to the UPC. It
incorporates the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act79into Utah's
comprehensive treatment of probate problems. In general, its provisions provide the presumptions that control when the simultaneous deaths of two persons leave the passage of property uncertain. If the order of death cannot be ascertained, the distributor
is deemed to have survived the prospective distributee. The effect
of the law can be avoided by an expression of contrary intent in
the wilPO
UUPC section 2-1002 introduces a n ambiguity that may
cause problems in the event of the simultaneous deaths of testator and beneficiary. Section 2-601(2), as previously m e n t i ~ n e d , ~ ~
creates the presumption that the beneficiary failed to survive the
testator by 120 hours if it cannot be proven that the beneficiary
survived by 120 hours. On the other hand, section 2-1002 presumes that if there is no evidence that the beneficiary survived,
he is deemed to have predeceased the testator. Thus, the cases
covered by section 2-1002 are, for all practical purposes, subsumed within section 2-601(2). Section 2-1002 would be necessary
only in the rare instance that the testator expressly rejected the
120-hour survival requirement of section 2-601(1). In that case,
the presumption of section 2-601(2) would not be sufficient to
make a determination as to who died first, and the presumption
of section 2-1002 would be needed. The two sections must be read
as independent of each other, however, if double taxation and
double administration of the same assets are to be avoided where
the beneficiary dies less than 120 hours after the testator.

Article 111, the administrative and procedural core of the
Uniform Probate Code, provides a flexible system for administering estates? It presumes that the judicial role in probate administration should be passive until an interested person invokes the
-

-

79. 8 UNIFORM
LAWSANN.605 (1972). Part 10 represents the reenactment of UTAH
CODEANN.$ 5 74-5-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
80. UUPC $ 75-2-1006.
81. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
82. UPC art. III, General Comment; Note, Flexibility, The Uniform Probate Code k
Procedural Article, and Some Comparisons with Kentucky Statutes, 62 K Y . L.J. 1083,
1084-85 (1974). See generally Peterson, Idaho's Uniform Probate Code: A Bird's Eye View,
8 IDAHO
L. REV.289, 295-301 (1972).
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court's jurisdiction to resolve a problem.u3Although the UUPC
generally adopts the approach of the UPC, chapter I11 of the
UUPC substantively differs from article I11 of the UPC in approximately 30 areas. Although most of the changes are minoq8jsome
are substantial.

A. Part 1 G e n e r a l Provisions
UUPC section 3-105 embodies the first deviation from UPC
article III. Although section 3-106 has been deleted by the UUPC,
most of its principles have been incorporated into UUPC section
3-105. Section 3-105 of the UPC provides that the court,has exclusive jurisdiction in formal proceedings to administer and distribute the estate. The court has concurrent jurisdiction of any other
action in which the estate (through a personal representative)
may be a party, including actions to determine title to property
alleged to belong to the estate, and of any action in which property distributed by a personal representative is sought by creditors or other successors. UPC section 3-105 was designed to give
the probate court "unlimited power to hear and finally dispose of
all matters relevant to determination of the extent of the decedent's estate and of the claims against it? Utah omits the exclusive/concurrent jurisdiction distinction of UPC section 3-105, as
suggested by the comment to UPC section 3-106, which provides
an alternative provision for states having a single court of general
jurisdiction. The term "court" is defined in UUPC section 1-201
as the district court. A Utah district court is a court of general
j ~ r i s d i c t i o n ;hence,
~~
the court indicated by the UUPC would
have the requisite jurisdiction to dispose of all matters relating
to a decedent's estate.
A second difference is found by comparing the statutes of
limitation provided for probate proceedings. Both the UPC and
the UUPC establish a 3-year statute of limitation^.^' The UUPC,
83. UPC art. 111, General Comment; Note, Flexibility, The Uniform Probate Code's
Procedural Article and Some Comparisons with Kentucky Statutes, 62 K Y . L.J. 1083,
1086-87 (1974); see Robertson, The Uniform Probate Code: An Opportunity for Mississippi
Lawyers to Better Serve the Weak and the Grieving, 45 MISS.L.J. 1, 5 (1974); Straus, Is
& ESTATES
870, 872 (1972).
the Uniform Probate Code the Answer?, 111 TRUSTS
84. For example, under UUPC P 75-3-914, unclaimed assets escheat to the state
school fund. The UPC provided that the funds would be distributed to the "state escheat
fund"; however, the National Conference bracketed the term, indicating that deviation
would be acceptable. UPC § 3-914 & Comment.
85. UPC 9 3-105, Comment.
86. UTAHCODEANN. 4 78-3-4 (1953).
87. UUPC 0 75-3-107(1); UPC 4 3-108.
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however, provides a significant exception to the rule. UUPC section 3-107(d) states that an appointment proceeding, but not a
formal testacy proceeding, may be commenced after the statute
of limitations has expired if a personal representative has not
been previously appointed. A personal representative appointed
under this exception is then given the power to possess assets to
the extent necessary to confirm title in the rightful successors,
but claims other than administrative expenses may not be presented against the estate.88Thus, one who holds estate assets that
have been distributed without the appointment of a personal representative can never be sure that his title to the assets is secure.
At any time, regardless of the 3-year statute of limitations, a
personal representative could be appointed. The personal representative could then repossess and redistribute the estate assets.
Hence, in Utah the 3-year statute of limitations provides complete protection for only those estates in which a personal representative has been appointed. This deviation is contrary to the
UPC's policy of allowing estates to be informally settled without
probate where the successors so choose,8gand cannot be justified
in light of the perpetual uncertainties that it creates.
The last change contained in part 1of the UUPC is found in
section 3-109. Utah added this section to provide that where two
or more unprobated estates have the same heirs, the court may
grant letters of administration permitting joint administration of
both estates.'O Although the UPC does not contain a comparable
section, there is nothing in the code preventing the joint administration of separate estates. In any event, the Utah clarification is
consistent with the UPC policy of simplifying and speeding the
probate process.

B. Part 3-Informal

Probate and Appointment Proceedings

Informal probate and appointment proceedings are commenced by filing an application requesting the probate of a will
or the appointment of a personal representative. Both the UUPC
and the UPC require that notice of the application be given to any
interested person demanding it.91The UPC also requires that 120
hours elapse after death before the registrars2may issue a written
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

UUPC § 75-3-107(1)(d).
UUPC art. 111, General Comment.
UUPC § 75-3-109 is identical to UTAHCODEANN. § 75-4-6 (1953).
UUPC 6 75-3-204; UPC 3-204.
The UUPC defines the registrar as the district judge. UUPC § 75-1-201(36).The
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statement of informal probate or appointment." The UUPC,
however, eliminates the requirement that 120 hours elapse and
substitutes a notice r e q ~ i r e m e n tPursuant
.~~
to UUPC section 3310, the clerk of the court must provide notice by mail to each
heir or devisee 10 days prior to issuing the written statement of
informal probate or appointment. This is a departure from the
UPC, whose roots stem from non-notice English ecclesiastical
l a ~ . ~ W o n - n o t iprobate,
ce
which assumes that death itself is sufficient notice to heirs and devisees that they should act to protect
their interests in an estate, has worked well in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware for over 150 years.g6
Although the Utah notice-by-mail requirement on its face
does not substantially increase the burden on a personal representative and does increase the likelihood that heirs and devisees
will be able to protect their interests, UUPC sections 3-306(2) and
3-310(2) exhibit serious deficiencies. The sections fail to state
what, if any, notice should be provided if the identity or address
of an heir is unknown. UUPC section 1-401 states that when
notice is required and the identity or address of a person is not
known, notice by publication must be provided. Sections 3-306(2)
and 3-310(2) fail, however, to indicate whether section 1-401 is
applicable or what procedure should be followed in such circumstances. Thus, under the UUPC, it is theoretically impossible to
have an informal appointment proceeding if less than all the heirs
and their addresses are identifiable. This represents a substantial
departure from the UPC position that informal appointment
should ordinarily be available and that notice should seldom be
required.97Further, the delays inherent in identifying and locat ing heirs so that notice can be mailed to them are incompatible
with the UPC policy of speed and efficiency in distributing the
estate.
Three remedies to this problem are possible. First, Utah
could amend sections 3-306(2) and 3-310(2) to require notice by
UPC provides that the registrar may be either the judge or a person, including the clerk,
designated by the court. UPC Q 1-307.
93. UPC Q 3-302.
94. UUPC Q 75-3-302 makes the 10-day notice requirement of 9 75-3-306 a prerequisite to issuing the statement of informal probate. UUPC $0 75-3-307 and 75-3-310 apply
the identical notice requirements to informal appointment proceedings.
95. Straus, supra note 83, a t 871; see Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administration
Under the Uniform Probate Code, 110 TRUSTS& ESTATES
5, 9 (1971).
96. Straus, supra note 83, at 871.
97. See UPC $ 5 3-301, -307 to -309, art. 111, General Comment. See generally Peterson, supra note 82, a t 296.
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mail only to known heirs a t their last known addresses. Second,
Utah could amend the sections to incorporate by reference the
notice provisions of section 1-401.98If that were done, however,
the procedures for informal and formal appointment would be
very similar.99Hence, an attorney would always seek a formal
appointment with its concomitant judicial protection.100Finally,
Utah could bring the UUPC into conformity with the UPC by
eliminating the requirement of notice by mail.

C. Part 6-Personal Representative: Appointment, Control and
Termination of Authority
Both the UPC and the UUPC provide that prior to receiving
letters of administration, the personal representative must qualify by filing with the court "any required bond and a statement
of acceptance of the duties of office."lol The UPC generally rejects
the notion that bond should be required of a personal representative unless excused by will.lo2Instead, to protect against mismanagement of the estate by a personal representative, the UPC provides that interested persons may: (1) make demand prior to
notice of informal proceedings;lQ3(2) contest a requested appointment by use of a formal proceeding seeking the appointment of
another person as personal representative;lo4(3) block informal
administration by filing a formal petition with the court;Io5
(4) seek to have a restraining order entered against the personal
representative;lo6or ( 5 ) demand that the personal representative
post bond.lo7
Despite these UPC protections against mismanagement of
the estate, Utah competely rejects the UPC's policy that bond
ordinarily should not be required. UUPC section 3-603 requires
bond unless: (1) it is waived by the will; (2) all the heirs file a
98. It should be noted that UUPC § 75-1-401 embodies several changes from the
provisions of the corresponding UPC section.
99. Both would require that a petition be submitted to a district court judge. UUPC
§ § 75-3-301, -201(36), -402. Both would also require that the § 1-401 notice requirements
be met. UUPC 60 75-3-310, -403.
100. See UUPC $0 75-3-412, -414.
101. UPC 3-601.
102. Id. § 3-603, Comment.
103. Id. § 3-204.
104. Id. $ 5 3-401, -603, Comment.
105. Id. $8 3-105, -603, Comment.
106. Id. 3-607.
107. Id. 5 3-605. To be eligible foi this remedy, an interested person must have a t
least a $1,000 interest in the estate.
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written waiver; or (3) the court, acting on a petition for waiver
accompanying informal or formal appointment, determines that
bond is not necessary. The Utah section further provides that if
no bond is initially required because all of the heirs have waived
the requirement and it is later determined that other persons will
be heirs, the personal representative must post bond unless he
secures the additional waivers.
While it is possible that a court may be willing to waive bond
when requested to do so by the personal representative, the
UUPC bond requirement has little merit. The Utah change reflects the attitude that the traditional requirement of bond
should be preserved. The UPC safeguards surrounding the appointment of a personal representative, such as the rights of interested parties to challenge the appointment and request that bond
be filed, seem more than adequate to protect interested parties
without eliminating the UPC presumption that no bond is
needed.
The UUPC also differs from the UPC in the amount of bond
required. The UPC provides for bond, when required, equal in
amount to the estimated value of the decedent's personal estate
plus the income expected from the personal and real property
during the next year.lo8 In contrast, the UUPC requires bond
equal in amount to the value of the decedent's personal property
and real estate plus the income expected during the next year
from real and personal property, but permits such amount to be
reduced by the amount of secured claims against the property.log
This change, even coupled with the Utah presumption requiring
bond, causes no significant additional burden to the personal
representative,l1° and provides added protection to interested parties. Although real estate cannot be disposed of in fraudulent
transactions as easily as other types of assets, a bond will protect
rightful distributees should the personal representative transfer
the property to a bona fide purchaser for value. Therefore, although the change is inconsistent with the UPC's policy of simplicity and efficiency,lll the added measure of protection it affords may make it justifiable.
Utah also alters the UPC prerequisite that an interested per108. UPC § 3-604.
109. UUF'C § 75-3-604.
110. Bond is available for about $4 per $1,000 of bond desired. WESTERN
SURETY
COMPANY,
BONDRATEMANUAL,
at Jud-5 (Jan. 1975). Further, outstanding mortgages on
the real property reduce the amount of bond necessary.
111. See generally Robertson, supra note 83, at 7; Straus, supra note 83, at 871-72.
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son or creditor have a $1,000 interest in the estate before he can
demand bond. I l 2 The UUPC requires a $5,000 interest. I l 3 Utah's
inclusion of this section is puzzling. The section provides that if
bond has been excused under sections 3-603 or 3-604, even a
$5,000 interest will not qualify a party to demand bond."' Since
Utah starts with the presumption that bond is required unless
excused, inclusion of a provision whereby interested parties can
require the posting of bond unless the personal representative is
excused is unnecessary. Only if Utah were to adopt the UPC
presumption of not requiring bond would section 3-605 be necessary.
UPC section 3-607(a), allowing any interested person to petition the court for an order restraining a personal representative
from taking action that would unreasonably jeopardize the interest of the applicant, has been retained in the UUPC. Utah has,
however, added a clause that authorizes the court to order any
person suspected of concealment or embezzlement to appear and
account for such matters under oath.lI5It is not clear whether the
clause applies only to personal representatives, or to persons in
general? This addition, although not suggested by the UPC, is
compatible with the goal of streamlining the disposition of a decedent's estate. Utah courts can take jurisdiction of the few cases
in which the questions of concealment or embezzlement arise and
expedite the disposition process by determining whether the estate has been properly distributed.

D. Part 7-Duties and Powers of the Personal Representatives
UUPC part 7 differs in two major ways from the UPC. First,
it restricts the power of the personal representative to sell property, and second, it provides a maximum fee schedule for compensating personal representatives and attorneys. As to the first
difference, UPC section 3-704 provides that except for supervised
administrations, the personal representative shall, without judi112. UPC $ 3-605.
113. UUPC $ 75-3-605.
114. UUPC $ 75-3-605 indicates that: "the requirement [of bond] ceases if the
person demanding bond ceases to be interested in the estate, or if bond is excused as
provided in $ 5 75-3-603 or 75-3-604."
115. UUPC $ 75-3-607(3).
116. Since the clause is placed in the section entitled "Order Restraining Personal
Representative,"it would seem that the remedy applies only against personal representatives. However, the clause states that any person suspected of having concealed, etc.,
would be ordered to appear. Hence the ambiguity.
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cia1 supervision, proceed expeditiously with settlement and distribution of the estate. The corresponding Utah section creates an
exception that prevents the personal representative from selling
real property without court approval when an heir or interested
person files a demand with the court.l17The court, however, may
approve such a sale upon petition by the personal representative,
if proper notice has been given and a hearing held?
This deviation, reflecting the approach of the previous Utah
probate code,llg adds nothing but unneeded complexity to the
UPC. An interested party challenging the distribution proposed
by a personal representative under the UPC may do so by either
contesting the appointment of the personal representativelZ0or
petitioning the court for supervised administration of the estate.lZ1Further, the personal representative may be brought to
account for any wrongdoing to interested persons.1z2Any flexibility gained by the Utah approach is negligible since the UPC
allows judicial supervision of a single asset, if required by conflicting interested parties,lZ3and provides that a personal representative may be restrained in order to prevent unreasonable risk
to an interested party.lZ4Hence, Utah's additional requirement is
excess baggage, adding little protection and increasing the likelihood of delays in administering the estate.
One of the major differences between the UPC and the
UUPC is found in UUPC section 3-718, which provides for compensation of personal representatives and attorneys. In contrast
to the UPC, which states that personal representatives are entitled to reasonable compensation for their services,125the UUPC
establishes a fee schedule of maximum permissible charges?
The inherent danger of the UUPC fee schedule is that fees provided may come to be viewed as the norm, rather than the maximum. The maximum fee suggested by the UUPC is even more
likely to be viewed as the standard fee, since prior Utah law
provided a mandatory compensation schedule for personal repreUUPC $8 75-3-704, -710(2).
UUPC $ 75-3-710(3).
See UTAHCODE
ANN.$ 5 75-10-2 to -4 (1953).
UPC $$ 3-401, -603, Comment.
UPC 0 3-502.
UPC $ 3-703 states, in pertinent part, "A personal representative is a fiduciary
who shall observe the standard of care applicable to trustees . . . ."
123. See generally UPC $ 4 3-105, -603, Comment.
124. UPC 8 3-607.
125. Id. $ 3-719.
126. UUPC 6 75-3-718.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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~ e n t a t i v e s . Similarly,
'~~
since many Utah attorneys previously
operated under a court-approved minimum fee schedule,128there
is a danger that the UUPC maximum schedule will be used in
much the same way. Recently, the United States Supreme Court,
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,129struck down a real estate fee
schedule as violative of section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.lS0The Court used an "effect on competition" test, stating:
The record . . . reveals a situation quite different from what
would occur under a purely advisory fee schedule. Here a fixed,
rigid price floor arose from respondent's activities: every lawyer
who responded to petitioners' inquiries adhered to the fee schedule, and no lawyer asked for additional information in order to
set an individualized fee. 131

If Utah lawyers and personal representatives rely heavily on the
UUPC fee schedule, the practice proscribed in Goldfarb could
develop in Utah. While there is some authority that an anticompetitive marketing program created by a state legislature does not
violate the Sherman
this "state-action exemption" applies
only t o situations where t h e anticompetitive activity is
compelled, not merely prompted "by direction of the state acting
as sovereign."133The UUPC fee schedule is not compulsory;
hence, the legislative exception to the Sherman Act is not applicable.
Regardless of whether the UUPC fee schedule and its concomitant use violates the Sherman Act, the concept of such a
127. UTAHCODEANN.§ 75-11-25 (1953).
128. The following fees previously were part of the rules of practice of the Third
Judicial District, which includes Salt Lake City, Tooele, and Summit Counties:
In decedent's estate, the following schedule of attorney's fees in a normal
proceeding shall be allowed on the estate accounted for by the executor or
administrator, as hereinafter defined:
5Ci on the first $20,000.00
4 5 on the next $40,000.00
3 O i on the next $140,000.00
2 2 "i on the next $550,000.00
2"( on the next $750,000.00
1 1'; on the balance
Minimum fee
$250.00
Utah Dist. Ct. R. 24 (Third Judicial District) (as of April 26, 1974). Subsequently a rule
calling for a reasonable fee approved by the court was substituted. UTAHDIST. CT. R. 4.7
(effective Jan. 1, 1976).
129. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
130. 15 U.S.C. 9 1 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. 8 1 (1970).
131. 421 U.S. a t 781.
132. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
133. 421 U.S. a t 791.
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schedule is alien to the intent and purpose of the UPC. Economy
and efficiency of estate administration are not promoted by such
schedules. More importantly, the enlightened view of probate
fees is that they should reflect the complexity of the estate, the
amount of time spent, and the degree of risk undertaken by the
personal representative or attorney.134Further, when the Utah
legislature first considered the UUPC, the code did not contain a
fee ~chedu1e.l~~
This suggests that the schedule is a concession to
special interest groups rather than a rational departure from the
UPC.
The Utah statute varies slightly from UPC section 3-705 by
not requiring the personal representative to give notice of his
appointment to heirs and devisees. This is of little practical significance since UUPC section 3-302 requires a person seeking the
position of personal representative to give notice of his appointment.lJ6Further, an heir or interested person, pursuant to section
3-204, may demand notice of any probate proceeding.
Another Utah deviation from the UPC occurs in the provisions of UUPC section 3-709, "Power to Avoid Transfers. "I3' Both
codes give the personal representative the power to recover property transferred by the decedent in a transaction that is void or
voidable as against the rights of creditors.13*The UUPC, however,
adds that the personal representative is not required to bring such
an action unless requested to do so by creditors, who must then
pay the cost of litigation. This requirement effectively places the
burden of collection on the real party in interest, and is
commendable because it treats creditors as they would have been
treated had the decedent lived, i. e., the creditors would have been
forced to file suit to void such a transfer and would have been
required to pay the costs of litigation themselves. The UUPC
recognizes that there is no good reason to relieve creditors of these
responsibilities when the debtor dies.

E. Part 8-Creditors' Claims
There are essentially two differences between the UPC and
the UUPC in part 8. First, if notice has been published, the
134. See Kabaker, Probate Fees- Where Are We Headed?, 46 N.Y .S.B.J. 577, 58386 (1974);Hauptfuhrer, Variation in Probate Practices and Their Effects on Fees, 5 REAL
PROP.PROB.
& TRUSTJ. 503, 506 (1970).
135. See Giles & Miller, supra note 12, at 8.
136. Note 91 and accompanying text supra.
137. U U P C $ 75-3-709;UPC 3-710.
138. See, e.g., UTAHCODEANN. $ 25-1-3 et seq. (1953).
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UUPC subjects claims against the estate, arising before or after
the date of death, to a 3-month statute of limitations. The UPC
provides 4 months.13"n addition, the personal representative
may pay allowable claims against the estate beginning 3 months
after death under the UUPC; he is obligated to wait 4 months
under the UPC.140The shorter statute of limitations and shorter
waiting period before claims may be paid are minor changes. The
second and more significant difference is found in section 3-805,
"Priority of Claims." The UPC states that if the estate lacks
sufficient assets to pay all claims, then claims should be paid in
the following order:
(1) costs and expenses of administration; (2) reasonable funeral expenses, and reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending him; (3) debts and taxes with
preference under federal law or the laws of the state; (4) all
other claims.

In contrast, the UUPC provides that claims are to be paid in the
following order:
(a) Reasonable funeral expenses; (b) Costs and expenses of
administration; ( c ) Debts and taxes with preference under federal law; (d) Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital
expenses of the last illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending him; (e) Debts and taxes with preference under laws of this state; (f) All other claims.141

The practice of giving funeral expenses first priority in payment
is a vestige of prior Utah law.142The rationale for the other UUPC
changes is not apparent.
Although the notice requirements of UPC section 3-801 were
incorporated without change in the UUPC, they are worthy of
comment. Utah, here, could profitably have deviated from the
UPC approach in order to establish a more equitable system of
notice to creditors. Section 3-801 of both the UPC and UUPC
requires that notice be given to creditors if their claims are to be
barred by the %month statute of limitations. Constructive notice
by publication once each week for 3 consecutive weeks in a news139. UUPC $ $ 75-3-802-03; UPC $ § 3-802-03. Section 75-3-801 also reflects this
change by requiring that notice indicate that creditors must present their claims within 3
months instead of 4.
140. UUPC $ 75-3-807; UPC $ 3-807.
141. UUPC $ 75-3-805.
142. UTAHCODEANN.$ 75-9-21 (1953)
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paper of "general circulation" is sufficient. In contrast, section 1401, governing notice of hearing on a petition, section 3-204, relating to notice of any order or filing pertaining to property in which
a person may have an interest, section 3-403, pertaining to notice
of a hearing on formal testacy proceedings, and sections 3-1001
and 3-1002, dealing with notice on closing of the estate, require
that actual notice be furnished to creditors. Section 3-801, while
adequate for dealing with unidentified creditors, is unsatisfactory
for dealing with identifiable creditors. Although notice must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation, few of the newspapers that specialize in publishing such notices are widely read
by the public. Thus, while the large businesses who routinely
scrutinize such publications may be protected, small business
creditors may miss their opportunity to make a claim. Further,
creditors who receive payments at intervals of 3 months or more
might have their claims barred without so much notice as a
missed payment. Beneficiaries of the will or others interested in
avoiding reduction in the size of the estate should not be permitted to cut off legitimate claims of known creditors in such a manner.
In order to remedy this deficiency, both the UPC and the
UUPC should be amended to require actual notice to known creditors and publication in a newspaper of circulation broad enough
to reasonably reach unknown creditors. The burden imposed by
requiring actual notice by registered mail or some other means is
no greater than that imposed by other sections of the UPC.ld3
Requiring notice to unknown creditors by publication in a newspaper calculated to reach most parties would grant such creditors
a more reasonable opportunity to submit their claims. The burden imposed upon the estate to provide reasonable notice would
be comparatively small.

F. Part 9-Special ~ o v i s i o n Relating
s
to Distribution
Chapter 9 of the UUPC contains a handful of minor changes.
For example, whereas UPC section 3-914 provides that unclaimed
assets escheat to a state treasury fund, Utah allocates such
amounts to the state school fund.ld4Deviation on this point was
encouraged, however, since the UPC provision is contained in
brackets. Also, the UPC creates an 8-year statute of limitations
143. See, e.g., UPC $ 5 1-401, 3-204, -403, -1001, -1002.
144. UUPC $ 75-3-914. See note 84 supra.
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in determining whether qualifying persons may reclaim assets
that have escheated to the state.ld5In contrast, Utah provides no
statute of limitations in such cases.
Another minor difference is contained in UUPC section 3916, "Apportionment of Estate Taxes." UPC section 3-916 defines "tax" as federal estate and state inheritance taxes. Utah
uses the same definition, but adds that "tax" includes estate and
other death taxes payable to the state. This change is insignificant since Utah currently does not impose an estate or other
death tax in addition to the state inheritance tax.

G. Part 10-Closing Estates
Both the UPC and the UUPC provide three methods for
closing an estate. First, pursuant to section 3-1001, an estate may
be closed by a formal adjudication after the requisite notice to all
interested parties. Second, pursuant to section 3-1002, a testate
estate may be closed in a formal proceeding with notice to the
devisees. Res judicata protection is limited to the extent of the
notice provided. Since only limited protection is available with
section 3-1002, and the pleadings and proceeding required in a
closing under sections 3-1002 and 3-1001 are substantially similar, the attorney for the estate will ordinarily proceed under section 3-1001.14eUnder the third method, section 3-1003, both the
UUPC and the UPC provide that an estate may be closed upon
a verified statement by the personal representative. When this
method is used, Utah provides for a 4-month notice period instead of 6 months.14' Hence, the estate may be closed within 4
months of notice of publication to creditors, instead of 6.
Unfortunately, Utah has added language to section 3-1003
that negates the advantages of the section. The purpose of the
section is to provide a simple method of closing an estate when
the personal representative does not anticipate an immediate
need to protect himself from claims. The Utah change requires
that all distributees of the estate consent in writing before the
estate may be closed by a verified statement.148Since the verified
statement, when coupled with the consent requirement, requires
nearly the same procedure as section 3-1002 and would provide
145. UPC $ 3-914(b).
146. Crapo, Account, Distribution and Closing of Estates, in IDAHOESTATE
ADMINISTRATION
359, 374 (P. Peterson ed. 1974).
147. UUPC $ 75-3-1003.
148. UUPC $ 75-3-1003(1).

454

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

essentially the same protection to the personal representative
against claims by distributees who have consented, section 3-1003
becomes redundant. Utah's section 3-1003 adds nothing to that
which can already be accomplished under section 3-1002. The
flexibility provided by UPC section 3-1003, however, is forfeited
by Utah.
Utah has also added that any accounting before closing the
estate, required by sections 3-1001 through 3-1003, may be waived
if all the distributees consent in writing. This modification of the
UPC provides more flexibility. Distribution of the estate could be
materially speeded under any of the pertinent sections if accounting requirements were waived. However, the provision is not consistent with the UPC approach of providing different methods of
closing an estate, each with different degrees of protection for the
personal representative and distributees. By waiving the accounting requirement, the effect of the three Utah sections becomes
equivalent. Such an unstructured application of flexibility is
undesirable given the availability of the orderly UPC approach.

H. Part 12-Collection of Personal Property by Afidavit and
Summary Administration Procedure for Small Estates
In section 3-1201, both the UPC and the UUPC provide that
an estate consisting only of personal property of limited value
may be transferred to a successor without the need to appoint a
personal representative. In addition to other requirement^,'^^ the
UPC limits the applicability of this section to estates having a net
value of less than $5,000. In contrast, Utah permits application
of the section to estates of up to $10,000. This change is compatible with the UPC since it permits a greater number of estates to
be speedily and efficiently distributed.

The Utah legislature should be commended for adopting a
probate code similar to the UPC. Generally, the UUPC promotes
the UPC policy of providing a simplified, flexible method of administering estates. Many of the changes Utah has incorporated
into the UUPC, however, are unfortunate. For the most part, they
reflect Utah's unwillingness to move from its traditional approach to the more efficient approach of the UPC. In many in149. UPC §§ 3-1201(a)(2)to (4);UUPC § § 3-1201(l)(b)to (d).

4251

THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN UTAH

455

stances, Utah's revisions are unnecessary, suggesting a lack of
understanding of the implications of the UPC system; in some,
the work of special interest groups is apparent. It is hoped that
the Utah legislature will take advantage of the time available
before the UUPC becomes effective to review the wisdom of its
deviations from the UPC and make the Utah probate system
more harmonious with the policies pursued by the UPC.

